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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 





ROBERT DENNIS EAGLE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE~ffiNT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from conviction of theft, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended, 
in lhe Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, 
Judg~, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The app0llant was charged with the offense of theft, 
_, '~la'o'3 l\ 11isd<'!'1L'Clnor, in violation of Utah Code hnn. S 
~._-(;-.JD.l (l9S3), CIS i1ffi•!nd,,d (R.lO). ':'he appellant was tried 
;_:' '-l ~ur_-~· a~1J cuil'v'ict\ J of the: o:fcn:;c as c~argcd on August 
· , 1 t_ () S . }: I i:1 ~!: :=: d t ;,af:r, CcJun~y Jail ( R.l06). 
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Notice of appeal was timely filed on December 15, 1978, and 
bail was set on December 19, 1978 (R.lll,ll4). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the conviction 
rendered by the jury in the court below. 
£.TATENE:-.<T OF THE FACTS 
On March 25, 1978, the appellant and Luke Myles 
entered a Z.C.M.I. store located on Nain Street and South 
T~mple in Salt Lake City. They were seen in the Men's 
Suit D~partmcnt shortly before 6:00 p.m., the store's 
closing L1m~ (?.126). Mr. ~yles was carrying a raincoat 
which he subsc~ucntly gave to the appellant (R.l29,130). 
Clarence Duwayne Price, a security guard for 
~.C.M.I., saw ~yles stand at the end of a suit rack at 
a pLiCL' in tiw store whcre t1'o such racks stood sidc-by-
s Hk ( R. 13 0); seL' also Exhibit 1-S for store's floQr plan). 
·:·::·~' a[;p,·llant h'<'nt in-b,·th'l'L'n the racks on his knees, 
t~.H!~ :__hJ .sul t s frcn th·~ ~~1c:Zs a:~d stufft_:d lhem inside the 
L01.t (H.l3:_). 
. ' . ~ l :_ ; - ' \ : 
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registers (R.l32). When the appellant and Myles saw that 
security personnel were pursuing them and that confront&-
tion was imrninen~ Myles dropped the suits. Hr. Price 
grabbed the appellant in a bear-hug and the appellant 
yelled for Myles to run {R.l36). At trial it was shown 
that the merchandise involved was well over $100 in 
valud {Exhibits 4 and 5; R.l35-139). 
After each side had presented its case, 
defense counsel made a motion out of the presence of the 
JUry to have the theft charge dismissed {R.lSO). The 
court denied the motion stating "that the evidence in the 
case supported the necessary elements of theft" {R.l58). 
A directed verdict for the defendant was also requested 
and denied (R.l63). 
Jury instructions were discussed in chambers and, 
at that time, both parties made several exceptions. 
sp~cifically, appellant excepted to the Court's Instruction 
:;o. 10 as a comment on the evidence (R. 57,161, 162). The 
::1s~ruc~i0J1 stated: 
. A person's state of mind 
lS not al~ays susceptible of proof by 
dlr~ct and positive evidence, and, if not, 
rr,a~· ordlnarily be in:'errcd from acts, 
conduct, statemcntsor circumstances. 
~~r~llant al3o 0xc0pted to the court's failure to 
-~-
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(Appellant's Proposed Insturction No. 6, R. 37, 162). 
The court had refused to give this instruction since 
such an instruction is only proper where all the evidence 
is circumstantial and because there had been evidence at 
trial which was direct and positive (R.l63). 
The cour.t also refused to give Appellant's 
Proposed Insturction No. 7 regarding joint operation of 
act and intent (R.38,162). The court reasoned that since 
state of mind was an essential element of the offense, 
it was only necessary to define it as an element and 
to state what the law is regarding state of mind. 
Additional information was not required (R.l64). 
Appellant's Supplemental Instruction No. 3 on 
withdrawal from criminal activity was not given to the 
jury (R.46). Appellant duly excepted and the court replied 
that such an instruction was not supproted by the "facts 
and circumstances of the case" (R.l64). 
During closing arguments, ·~ounsel for the 
appellant dealt at length wi•h the fact that the defendant 
had fail~d to take the stand. Counsel explained to the 
jury that the reason the defendant had not taken the 
stand was that it had been counsel's dec~5ion as the 
accused's attorney (R.l76). Counsel reasoned that there 
was no need for a;)p•.'llant :o t~sti~~· since he could ha\'•' 
added notlll:1CJ •co ·~'<·e ._·;.:_,;e;",c>' (:\.l7f.). 
-~-
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In response to this argument, the State referred 
to the defendant's failure to take the stand. The defenae 
objected but the court stated: 
He [counsel for appellant] has dealt 
at some length about that and I will let 
you respond in some way. You know what 
the limitations are and don't go beyond 
that. 
(R.l87). The prosecutor attempted to rebut the argument 
that the defendant could have added nothing by testifying. 
An objection was made and the court then probhibited any 
further comment (R.l87). 
A motion for mistrial, based on the prosecutor's 
closing comments, was made by appellant (R.l89). The 
court denied the motion stating that the prosecutor's 
co~ent was not even harMless error (R.l90). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
TO SUBMIT APPELLNJT'S PROPOSED 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
This court has set the standard for determining 
~hen an instruction must be given to a jury: 
It is admitted that the defendant is 
entitled to have the jury instructed on 
his theory of the case if there is any 
substantial evidence to justify giving 
such an instruction. 
"'"3'c•; v. ,Jonnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738, 743,744 (1947). 
!lso Stat·:c v. Smith, 571 P.2d 578 (Utah 1977). 
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In addition, an instruction should not be given when it is 
not an accurate statement of the law. 
At trial the appellant requested several 
instructions and now claims that the failure to submit 
his Proposed Insturction Nos. 6 and 7 and Supplemental 
Insturction No. 3 was error. 
A 
APPELLANT'S PROPOSED SUPPLE~ffiNTAL 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 WAS CORRECTLY 
DENIED BECAUSE IT IS NOT AN ACCURATE 
STATEHENT OF THE LAW AND IS UNSUPPORTED 
BY THE FACTS. 
Appellant's Proposed Supplemental Instruction 
No. 3 is allegedly based upon Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-307 
(1953), as amended, which reads: 
Voluntary Termination of Efforts Prior 
to Offcnse.--It is an affirmative defense 
to a prosecution in which an actor's 
criminal responsibillty arises from his 
own conduct or from being a party to an 
offense under section 76-2-201 [76-2-202) 
that prior to the commission of the offense, 
the actor voluntarily terminated his effort 
to promote or facilitate its commission 
and either: 
(l) Gave timely warning to the 
proper law enforcement authorities or 
the intended victim; or 
(2) \~holly deprives his pri efforts 
of effectiveness in the commlssic, .. 
The appellant's instruction stated that the defendant would 
be "not guilty" i: the jury found :rom the evidence that t~c 
defendant v.•holly dc·,,r ivc'd his prior cf:orts in the corunissl 2 ~ 
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This is not an accurate statement of the law 
because, in addition to finding that the defendant vbolly 
deprived his efforts of effectiveness the jury ~•t alao 
find that the defendant voluntarily ~erminated his 
effort to commit the offense. 
In State v. Smith, this Court outlined the 
requirements of Section 76-2-307: 
For a defendant's actions to be considered 
as a voluntary termination under the statute, 
he must show (1) that he voluntarily terminated 
his efforts prior to the commission of the 
offense; and (2) gave timely warning; or (3) 
wholly deprived his prior efforts of 
effectiveness. 
571 P.2d at 580. 
In the case at bar, the appellant did not 
voluntarily terminate his actions. Rather, the facts 
show that the proximity of the security personnel caused 
the termination of the offense (dropping the suits). 
Thus, had capture not been quite so immiment, the 
appellant would never had "terminated" his efforts. 
It cannot be said that the termination was in any way 
"voluntary" because appellant only abandoned the goods 
~hen he realized there was no chance of escaping with 
Furthermore, appellant's proposed instruction 
~2s not supproted by the facts since under Section 
-7-
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76-2-307, the actor must voluntarily terminate his 
efforts prior to the commission of the offense. As 
will be shown in Point III, infra, the crime of theft 
as defined by Section 76-4-404 was completed before 
the goods were abandoned. 
B 
WHEN THE PROSECUTION'S CASE IS 
BASED ON BOTH DIRECT AND 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THE 
TRIAL COUR~ MAY PROPERLY REFUSE 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON REASONABLE 
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS. 
Ap;·ellant' s Proposed Instruction No. 6 was 
not submitted to the jury. The instruction read: 
To warrant you in convicting the 
defendant of the crime charged in the 
Information, or of any crime included 
therein, the evidence must, to your minds, 
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other 
than that of the guilt of the defendant; 
that is to say, if after a full and fair 
consideration and comparison of all th~ 
testimony in the case you can reasonably 
explain the facts in evidence on any 
reasonable ground other than the guilt 
of the defendant, then you must find him 
not guilty. 
(R.37). Appellant contends that the failure to submit 
the above instruction was reversible error; however, 
the trial court did not err because the element of 
intent v.·as not based solely on circumstantial evidence. 
In Stale v. Garci:~, ll l;tilh 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57 
-~-
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. • • It is universally recognized 
that there is no jury question without 
substantial evidence indicating defendant'• 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
requires evidence from which the jury 
could reasonably find defendant guilty 
of all material issues of fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In applying this rule, 
usually with reference to the jury 
instructions, we have held that where 
the only proof of material fact or one which ia 
a necessary element of defendant's guilt 
consists of circumstantial evidence, such 
circumstances must reasonably preclude 
at 
every reasonable hypothesis of defendant's 
innocence. An instruction to this effect 
in an appropriate situation would be proper 
but this requires care to use language which 
the jury would understand and which would 
not merely lend to their confusion. 
We must keep in mind that this rule is 
applicable only where the proof of a material 
issue is based solely on circumstantial 
evidence .•. 
59 (emphasis added). See also State v. Bender, 
1019, 1021 (Utah 1978). 
It should be noted that the prosecutor in this 
that the appellant's proposed instruction may 
appropriate since he believed that the evidence 
v:as wholly circumstantial. The distinction to be made 
1s that the instant case is not based solely on circumstantial 
c~id~nce. The physical evidence introduced at trial and 
:h~ testimony of Mr. Clarence Price constituted direct 
LVld~nc~ which convinced the trial judge that the case 
·.:J.:o b.>s~d on direct evidence: 
-9-
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Where we have evidence here that 
is direct and positive, eye-witness 
testimony of two guys taking a suit, 
wrapping it in an overcoat, throwing 
it over their shoulder, starting to 
walk out the store, that is not 
circumstantial evidence. I don't 
think under the facts and circumstances 
of this case the reasonable hypothesis 
instruction is proper. 
(R.l63,164). 
Where the evidence is not completely circum-
stantial, the trial judge may properly leave the 
determination to the jury on the basis of reasonable 
doubt. State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); 
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970); 
State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P. 2d 486 (1961). 
Even a combination of direct and circumstantial 
evidence would not warrant such an instruction. State v. 
Fort, 572 P.2d 1387, 1390, 1391 (Utah 1977). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the evidence was 
all circumstantial, an instruction on reasonable 
alternative hypothesis need not be given. In Holland v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 121, reh. denied 348 U.S. 932 
(1954), the petitioners assailed the refusal of the 
trial judge to instruct that v:here the Government's 
evidence is circumstantial it must ba such as to exclude 
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• • • the better rule is that 
where the jury is properly instructed 
on the standards for reasonable doubt, 
such an additional instruction on 
circumstantial evidence is 
confusing and incorrect [citation• 
omitted]. 
Circumstantial evidence in thia 
respect is intrinsically no different 
from te~timonial evidence. Admittedly, 
circumstantial evidence may in some 
cases point to a wholly incorrect 
result. Yet this is equally true of 
testimonial evidence. In both 
instances, a jury is asked to weigh 
the chances that the evidence correctly 
points to guilt against the possibility 
of inaccuracy or ambiguous inference. 
In both, the jury must use its 
experience with people and event• in 
weighing the probabilities. If the 
jury is convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt, we can require no more. 
~ at 139-140. 
The law is primarily concerned that an 
accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-501 
(1953), as amended. There is no need to risk confusing 
tt~ j~ry with instructions to the effect that if the 
~~ide~ce is circumstantial it must exclude every 
r~2sonable hypothesis other than guilt. If a jury, 
c:;-o:-~ lveighing all evidence whether circumstantial or 
j_r~:=, is convinced of a defendant's guilt beyond 
• ' :,:;c;'.:lble doubt to1C law is satisfied. 
-ll-
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Respondent submits that the evidence introduced 
at trial was direct rather than circumstantial and, at 
best, was a combintation of direct and circumstantial 
evidence; therefore, the trial court was correct in not 
submitting the instruction on reasonable alternative 
hypothesis to the jury. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 WAS 
CO~STITUTIONAL SINCE IT DID NOT 
DEMAND THAT INTENT BE PRESUMED. 
The court offered the following instruction 
to the jury as part of Instruction No. 10: 
• A person's state of mind is 
not always susc~ptible of proof y direct 
and positive evide~ce, and, if not, may 
ordinar ·l.Y be infe:·red from acts, conduct, 
statements or circumstances. 
(R. 57) (emphasis added). 
Appellant now contends that allowing ~he jury 
~o infer intent is a denial of due process of law under 
the Fourteenth i©endr:1Cnt to the United St;:1tes Constitutior. 
bc'causc· it has the effect of shifting the burden of 
;.o-·t·su.>slon to thc defcnciant. Appellant solely relics 0:1 
;__:. s. , 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979), 
ur ... ' ~- ' 
. \ ! ;- .. _ t 1 ~- -
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outlined two types of instructions in this area that 
would deny due process: (1) an instruction constituting 
a burden-shifting presumption like that in Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 u.s. 684 (1975), where the burden shifted 
to the defendant to prove that he lacked the requisite 
mental state; or (2·) a conclusive presumption (irrebuttable) 
which would eliminate intent as an element of the offense 
and would conflict dangerously with the presjmption of 
innoence. Therefore, the instruction stating that •the 
law presumes intent" was declared unconstitutional because 
it could have been interpreted as either a burdenshifting 
presumption or a conclusive presumption. 99 S.Ct. 2459. In 
short, it required the jury to infer intent, effectively 
relieving the State of its burden of proof. 
Furthermore, it is proper for a jury to infer 
intent from acts, conduct, statements or circumstances. 
In State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 486, 359 P.2d 486, this 
Court held: 
It is to be remembered that intent, 
being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible 
of direct proof. But it can be inferred 
from conduct and attendant circumstances 
in the light of human experience .... 
2=9 P.2d at 487. 
This Court also stated in State v. Romero, 
-:,.J P.2u 216, 218 (Utah 1976), that intent to steal 
-13-
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property can be inferred by defendant's conduct and the 
attendant circumstances testified to by the witnesses. 
See also State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 422 P.2d 196, 
198 (1967): "[W)e are aware of no better nor persuasive 
way to do it {prove what a man intended) than by showing 
both what he did and what he said. 
In the case at bar, the jury was not directed 
to automatically find intent. The instruction described 
a permissive inference of intent rather than the type of 
conclusive presumption prohibited by Sandstrom. The jury 
was told that they "may" infer intent, therefore, the 
State was not relieved of any burden. The prosecution 
was still required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
~very fact necessary to constitute the offense. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE COURf 
BELO\~. 
The fundamental rule governing a claim of 
insuffici~nt evidence on appeal is that the evidence 
and all inferences fairly to be dra~n therefrom must 
b~ viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. State \'. 1-:ilso:-~, 565 P. 2d 66 (Utah 1977). 
\'il•\.:ing thL' cvidc•nce prcsc•ntcd at trial in the light 
most favorable to the VLrdict, includinq any reasonable 
-l~-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Utah 1977); State v. Canfield, supra, clearly the record 
contains substantial evidence from which the jury could 
infer appellant took the suits with the requisite 
criminal intent. 
Appellant argues that because he was not 
successful in leaving z.c.M.I. with the two suits, he 
cannot be said to have committed the offense of theft. 
However, successful conversion of the goods is not an 
element of the offense. 
In order to find guilt in the theft charge 
under Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1953), as amended, 
the jury must find that the accused obtained or exercised 
unlawful control over the property of another with a 
purpose to deprive the owner of that property. The 
evidence in the record and the inferences fairly drawn 
therefrom, vie1ved in the light most favorable to and 
supportive of the verdict are as follows: 
1. The appellant entered the Z.C.M.I. store 
int~nding to deprive them of their merchandise. 
2. The appellant dropped to his knees between 
t~o suit racks and stuffed two men's suits into a raincoat. 
3. The appellant did not pay for the suits. 
4. The appellant then attempted to leave 
':..::, ~to:-~ \-;ith the goods. 
-15-
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5. The appellant was beyond the last cash 
register, just short of the door, when he was apprehended 
by security personnel. 
This evidence supports a finding by the jury 
that the appellant exercised unauthorized control over the 
property with the intent to deprive thereof. 
This Court in State v. Middelstat, 579 P.2d 908 
at 909 (1978), stated that before it can be said that the 
evidence is insufficient to uphold a conviction, it must 
be shown that the quality of the testimony given is "so 
improbable that it is completely unbelievable." In this 
case the jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve the 
State's witnesses, one of which was an eye-witness to the 
commission of the offense. In the case of State v. Wilson, 
this Court stated: 
Id .. :lt 68. 
The judging of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence is 
exclusively the prerogative of the jury. 
Consequently, we are obliged to assume 
that the jury believed those aspects of the 
evidence, and drew those inferences that 
reasonably could be drawn therefrom, in 
the light favorable to the verdict. 
rurt11Lrnor~, ~dditio~al information in the 
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for insufficient evidence. Counsel for appellant then 
argued that at best the State had only shown atteapted 
theft. The court denied the motiong stating: 
[T]he crime of theft involves not 
so much an act, as an intent followed 
by an act. It is like burglary. You 
enter a building with the intent to commit 
a theft. The fact you don't succeed in 
committipg that theft doesn't make it any 
less a burglary. The crime is committed 
when the building is entered unlawfully for 
that purpose. The purpose to deprive means 
to have the conscious objective to do 
something, to deprive the owner of the 
property. And so when you do something 
with that conscious objective, the 
fact you don't get away with it and 
don't succeed in accomplishing that 
objective, doesn't mean that you are not 
guilty of the offense itself. (R.l57, 
158) 
I think when somebody wraps up two 
suits in a topcoat and slings them over 
their shoulers, thinking they are buried, 
and starts to walk out of the 'store, he 
is exercising unauthorized control over 
:he property. 
In sum, the evidence in this case justifies 
the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the 
facts. That is, that the appellant went into the 
stcr·•, took ti·:O suits off of a rack, wrapped the 
s:.L::cs ln a raincoat and started to leave without 
:~:~~ Lhrough the usual process when buying a suit 
o:· :_:~l'~i::g :o a clerk, discussing the merchandise, 
·- ., - • L~c suit on and without paying for the 
-l/-
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POINT IV . 
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENT ON THE 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY 
WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
A. 
THE REMARK WAS A PROPER 
RESPONSE TO DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
Ordinarily, a prosecutor is not allowed to comment 
on the defendant's failure to testify. Griffith v. California, 
380 U.S. 609 (1965). However, in a number of cases it has 
been held that a defendant cannot complain that a comment 
on his failure to testify was error when the remark was 
invited or provoked by the defendant's attorney. For 
example, the Eighth Circuit in Babb v. U.S., 351 F.2d 863 
(1965), held that reference to the defendant's failure 
to take the stand made by the defendant's attorney with an 
explanation of such failure was an invitation to the prosecute: 
to respond and comment on the subject. 
This Court has also held that a responsive comment 
on a defendant's failure to testify is not error. In State 
\'. Boone, 581 P.2J 571 (utah, 1978), the defense attorney 
referred to the court's i~struction on the defendant's right 
not to ta!~e the stand and suggested reasons for the defendant's 
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decision not to take the stand. The prosecutor reaponde4 to 
this argument by stating that there could have been other 
reasons why the defendant had not testified, such aa the 
fear of rigorous cross-examination. The Court atated: 
The reply of the prosecutor was 
not improper and did not emphasize 
the failure of the defendant to 
testify. That matter have been brought 
up by the defendant's counsel and the 
prosecutor was simply emphasizing one 
of the reasons suggested by defense 
counsel as to why the defendant did not 
take the stand. 
Id. at 574. 
Similarly, in this case, the defendant referred 
to the court's Instruction No. 6 regarding a defendant'• 
failure to take the stand (R. 175-176). Counsel then 
offered an explanation for choosing not to put 
the defendant on the stand: that it had been counsel's 
decision as the defendant's attorney and that the defendant 
could add nothing to the evidence by testifying (R. 176). 
In reply, the prosecutor did not emphasize the 
de:endant's failure to testify, rather, the comments were 
ncrely responsive to remarks made by defense counsel. The 
Stut~. contrary to the defense attorney's position, attempted 
~o s'lo\·.' that the defendant could have added something--he 
-19-
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could have revealed the reason why he did not go to the 
first cash register in the men's suit department (R. 187). 
In short, the prosecutor's response was proper and, 
therefore, does not require that the conviction be reversed. 
B. 
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE REMARK 
WAS ERROR, IT WAS ONLY HARM-
LESS ERROR. 
Assuming that the prosecutor's comment on the 
defendant's failure to testify was error, it was harmelss 
error because (1) it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
and (2) the trial judge immediately stopped any further 
comment on the subject. 
In Chaoman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the 
United States Supreme Court defined the standard for harmless 
error. The Court held that when a reviewing court is asked 
to decide if a remark pertaining to a defendant's failure to 
testify violates the defendant's fifth amendment privilege 
~gainst self-incrimination, an error is harmless if it is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also explained 
th~t this standard was the equivalent of the standard 
an::o:Jnccd in fa~v ~. Ccnnocticut, U.S. 85 (1963), that an 
on·or is h.1rJ:\e>lss unle>ss there is a "reasonable possibility 
convictio;-1." Id .. 1t ?t), S~ 
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In this case, the prosecutor's comment iD 
closing argument was harmless since the evidence va• 
sufficient to justify conviction regardless of any reference 
to the defendant's failure to testify. Furthermore, the 
alleged error was cured by the trial judqe's conduct in 
preventing further ~ornrnent and was sufficient to cure any 
potential prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the jury inthe laver 
court was properly instructed on the law. A defendant i• 
entitled to be given an instruction on his theory of the 
case only if there is substantial evidence to support such 
iastruction. The appellant's supple~nntal Instruction No. 3 
~:as r.ot a correct statement of the law. In addition, an 
instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis was not 
required in this case because of proof of intent to deprive 
~as not solely based on circumstantial evidence. Finally, 
t~e Court's Instruction No. 10 was an accurate definition 
of t~e law because the jury rnay properly infer intent from 
,~~3:~ti-::,:L:r acts, co:1duct, statements or circumstances. 
T~e corn~ents made during closing argument 
,~t::1:~~~g to the defendant's failure to testify were 
~c;: "::c;~··c i:!nd therefore, not reversible error. Even 
-2~-
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assuming the remark was error, it was only harmless error 
because it was not prejudicial to the defendant. The 
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, therefo", 
the prosecutor's comment did not contribute to the conviction 
and in short, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Accordingly, respondent urges this Court to 
affirm the verdict of guilty rendered by the jury in the 
court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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